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Point 59 Battle Honour
Point 59 is the Battle Honour granted to Canadian units participating in actions fought near this location during the latter stages of the Moro River campaign during December 1943-January 1944 as part of the fighting of the Italian Campaign during the Second World War.
Background
The overall strategic and operational context of the battle at San Nicola-San Tommaso is explained in the article on The Moro. In brief, Allied grand strategy in Italy in December 1943 was a co-ordinated offensive on Rome by the two armies in Italy (U.S. 5th and British 8th). The 1st Canadian Division's ultimate goal was Pescara.
The immediate goal of the 1st Division in December 1943 was to cross three rivers: The Feltrino, the Moro, and the Arielli. During the first three weeks of December, the entire division was involved in costly attempts to first cross the Moro River, and then a feature known as The Gully. The coastal city of Ortona was defended by German paratroopers and had to be taken by house-to-house fighting by the 2nd Brigade in a week-long battle that ended on 28 December when the Germans pulled out of what was left of the city.
During the fighting to cross the Gully, a long, deep ravine running parallel to the Orsogna-Ortona lateral road, a salient had been formed in the German defensive line. Simultaneous to the fighting in Ortona, renewed efforts to expand this success were made. These operations, by the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, were intended to cut the main coast road and effectively isolate the German garrison in Ortona from reinforcement or withdrawal. The Canadian official historian has surmised that "there is little doubt that the threat which they created to his communications hastened the enemy's decision to concede the town to the 2nd Brigade."
The junction of the Orsogna-Ortona lateral, and a secondary road from San Leonardo, had been given the code-name CIDER. Approximately a mile to the west of CIDER, the road to Tollo was cut by the narrow Riccio River valley about 1,000 yards before reaching Villa Grande. The Riccio flowed northerly, entering the sea at Torre Mucchia.
This stream formed with the sea coast and the blood-soaked Gully south of the Ortona-Orsogna road a rough triangle, enclosing a narrow plateau, which was itself intersected by numerous gullies and watercourses. A more westerly branch of the Riccio joined the main stream about a mile and a half inland, and on the high ground between the forks stood the small hamlets of San Nicola and San Tommaso. It was the task of the 1st Brigade to attack northward from the southern apex and drive the Germans from their positions along the west side of this triangle. After the capture of the crossroads the brigade had enjoyed two or three days of relative inaction during which the R.C.R. reorganized its hard-hit companies, and' patrols from the 48th Highlanders felt out the enemy's positions on the plateau. On 20 December and succeeding days the Highlanders watched heroic but unsuccessful attempts by a battalion of the 8th Indian Division to take Villa Grande. Patrols reported that the paratroopers were holding the Villa Grande road in strength, and were still firmly dug in east of the Riccio gully.
On 22 December, Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Spry, in temporary command of the 1st Brigade, received orders for what would be in effect the third phase of the earlier MORNING GLORY operation. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was to establish a firm base on the Tollo road in order that the 48th Highlanders might pass through and capture San Nicola and San Tomasso, with The Royal Canadian Regiment then passing through them and on to the coast, trapping the German garrison in Ortona.
Four field regiments and three medium regiments of artillery were provided for support, but heavy rain on the night of 22-23 December once again ensured difficult conditions for the tanks of "A" Squadron of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment), who were ordered to support the attack. The salient that was about to be created by the drive across the muddy plateau was to be supplied by a fleet of DUKWs (amphibious trucks) loaded at San Vito and told to land on the Adriatic coast at a prearranged point when they were needed.
The attack of the Hastings began at 09:30hrs on 23 December, as the battalion set off north from the area of Casa Berardi, and after an hour had neared the objectives north of the Villa Grande road. However, the two leading companies went to ground in the face of shells and mortar bombs and suffered heavy casualties.
In its early stages the battle went well. Able company on the left and Charlie on the right advanced three quarters of a mile, behind a barrage, against intense machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire. By 1030 hours, both companies were within a few hundred yards of their objectives, but now the artillery could no longer help them, and the weight of the enemy fire increased. A squadron of tanks, held up by enemy mine fields, failed to arrive as planned, and Baker, swinging to the right of the enemy strongpoints, attempted an assault without armoured support. The attempt failed, bloodily, but when two tanks belatedly appeared, the attack was renewed, this time with success. Overrunning the opposition, the forward platoon and the two tanks slaughtered the paratroopers where they stood, and only a few of the Germans remained alive to be herded to the rear as prisoners.
Dusk had fallen by this time and the impetus of the assault was gone. Thrusting far into the enemy lines, the Regiment was now exposed to attack from three sides, but though the Germans probed angrily all night long, they failed to break into the salient. They did, however, succeed in preventing the pioneer platoon from clearing paths through a second mine field in order that the tanks could assist in the next day's operations.6
Enemy reports admitted heavy losses of their own during this action. By noon on 24 December, the Hastings was far enough forward to attempt to consolidate the original objective, and engineers of the 1st Field Company began the task of clearing lanes through the minefields, despite continuous shellfire.
The 48th Highlanders had begun their own attack in terrible conditions, in rain and darkness and without artillery support or hope of tank support. The unit had to move in single file along a footpath not shown on maps, hardly noticeable on aerial photographs, and one that had in fact not been reconnoitred.
So dark was the night that in order to keep direction each had to hold on to some part of the equipment of the man ahead. Two unguarded houses filled with Germans opening Christmas presents yielded 19 prisoners. By morning of the 24th the battalion was at its objective on the eastern bank of the Riccio, overlooking San Nicola and San Tommaso.
The 48th sent a strong fighting patrol back to bring up support weapons but found paratroopers of the 3rd Battalion of Parachute Regiment 3 blocking their way, and they were unable to break through to the Canadian lines held by the Hastings. Efforts on the 24th to establish contact between both battalions were unsuccessful, and patrols were stopped by machine-gun fire. Three days of continuous rain reduced the area to a vast sea of mud in which tanks could not operate, and the fleet of DUKWs could not be dispatched until the brigade reached the coast and secured a landing point. The 48th Highlanders could only ration their meagre supplies; three sheep found in their area were added to the food supply. Attacks in company strength by the RCR and Hastings to try and reach the cut-off 48th were repulsed with heavy losses. However, the Germans did not realize that the 48th had established themselves in battalion strength, and not until 26 December were counter-attacks launched in their direction.
The brigade commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Spry, abandoned the plan of cutting the coast road on the morning of 25 December and instead ordered the RCR to carve out a corridor to the 48th, through which supplies could go forward and casualties could be evacuated back. After a day of constant fighting with determined groups of enemy soldiers, the RCR managed to link up with the 48th, and a carrying party of 60 men from the divisional machine gun battalion (Saskatoon Light Infantry) went out at dusk to take food and ammunition to the Highlanders. They returned at dawn on 26 December with their wounded.
At 10:00 a.m. on 26 December the 3rd Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment attacked and penetrated the Highlanders' positions, and some very close fighting followed.By midday, however, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Engineers and the Ontarios' drivers to move armour through the long salient, one troop of tanks had arrived on the scene. With this long-awaited support Johnston's men struck out vigorously at the paratroopers, driving them across the Riccio towards San Nicola and San Tommaso, and killing or capturing an estimated 100. The other two battalions of the brigade joined in routing the enemy from the scattered buildings along the edge of the plateau, and by 27 December the east bank of the Riccio upstream from San Tommaso was in our hands
In the wake of the retreat from Ortona, it was believed the Germans would withdraw to the Arielli River, a natural defensive obstacle which had many tactical characteristics that had been exploited very well on the Moro River line and during the fighting for the Gully. However, in actuality General Herr had decided on 27 December to pull back to a line running from Torre-Mucchia to run inland, west of Sn Tommaso and Villa Grande. The 1st Brigade were ordered to take both San Nicola and San Tommaso, and the 3rd, which had been rested and received reinforcements, directed to carry on to the Arielli River. Brigadier Gibson of the 3rd Brigade tasked the Royal 22e Regiment with taking the high ground between the forks of the Riccio while The Carleton and York Regiment was to cut the coast road and seize the Torre Mucchia headland, also known, to the Germans as well as the Canadians, as Point 59. The West Nova Scotia Regiment would clear the remaining ground between the Riccio and the Arielli Rivers.
It soon became apparent that the enemy was not prepared to relinquish any defensible ground without dispute. As the Royal 22e (commanded since 18 December by Major J. V. Allard) moved forward from the 48th Highlanders' area on the morning of the 29th, they came under considerable fire from the far side of the Riccio; a little later the Carleton and Yorks, approaching Highway No. 16 from the south, were halted by shelling and by determined machine-gun fire sweeping inland from the bare top of Point 59. The triangular promontory, protected on two sides by its steep seaward flanks, was held by fresh paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, which had been transferred to the coast from the right wing of the 76th Corps during the night of 27-28 December.
The enemy's interest in Torre Mucchia was understandable; its retention not only gave him effective control of the highway, but denied the Allies excellent observation of long stretches of the coast to the north. In the face of the unexpectedly strong resistance Gibson ordered the Carleton and Yorks to close into a defensive position. During the night the Germans blew the bridge which carried the highway across the mouth of the Riccio.
On the morning of the 30th the Royal 22e secured their objective within the forks of the Riccio after two costly attempts on the previous day had failed. The C.O. judged that to advance farther would create too dangerous a salient, and ordered the attack stopped.The Carleton and Yorks on the coast road had less success. When mines and mud halted a troop of the Ontarios' "B" Squadron supporting a company which Lt: Col. Pangman sent forward to clear the headland, the infantry dug in to guard the stranded tanks and await reinforcement. The year ended darkly for the New Brunswick unit. A second company attack early on the 31st was thrown back in confusion, and the few tanks that managed to reach the battalion bogged down and had to be protected. Orders came from Brigade Headquarters to postpone further attempts to take Torre Mucchia by direct assault, and instead to reduce the German resistance with mortar and observed artillery fire. Late on New Year's Eve the enemy launched a furious counter-attack under cover of lashing rain and a raging gale which swept in across the bleak coast. The relentless paratroopers burst in among the two forward companies, forcing them back and inflicting more than 50 casualties.
Point 59 did not fall until 4 January. On that day field, medium and heavy artillery regiments joined in a complex programme of sharp concentrations which intermittently switched from one target to another across the divisional front. At 4:30 p.m., before the bewildered enemy had recovered from these barrages or decided from what direction our infantry would strike, a company of the Carleton and Yorks (the regiment was now commanded by Major E. D. Danby) put in a two-pronged attack on Torre Mucchia from the highway and from the beach. By nine o'clock the promontory was in our hands. As usual the paratroopers had resisted fiercely; after the engagement 40 of them were buried near the old look-out tower. The Canadians had lost but three killed and four wounded.
The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Point 59" for participation in these actions:
1st Canadian Armoured Brigade
Background
The overall strategic and operational context of the battle at San Nicola-San Tommaso is explained in the article on The Moro. In brief, Allied grand strategy in Italy in December 1943 was a co-ordinated offensive on Rome by the two armies in Italy (U.S. 5th and British 8th). The 1st Canadian Division's ultimate goal was Pescara.
The immediate goal of the 1st Division in December 1943 was to cross three rivers: The Feltrino, the Moro, and the Arielli. During the first three weeks of December, the entire division was involved in costly attempts to first cross the Moro River, and then a feature known as The Gully. The coastal city of Ortona was defended by German paratroopers and had to be taken by house-to-house fighting by the 2nd Brigade in a week-long battle that ended on 28 December when the Germans pulled out of what was left of the city.
During the fighting to cross the Gully, a long, deep ravine running parallel to the Orsogna-Ortona lateral road, a salient had been formed in the German defensive line. Simultaneous to the fighting in Ortona, renewed efforts to expand this success were made. These operations, by the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, were intended to cut the main coast road and effectively isolate the German garrison in Ortona from reinforcement or withdrawal. The Canadian official historian has surmised that "there is little doubt that the threat which they created to his communications hastened the enemy's decision to concede the town to the 2nd Brigade."
The junction of the Orsogna-Ortona lateral, and a secondary road from San Leonardo, had been given the code-name CIDER. Approximately a mile to the west of CIDER, the road to Tollo was cut by the narrow Riccio River valley about 1,000 yards before reaching Villa Grande. The Riccio flowed northerly, entering the sea at Torre Mucchia.
This stream formed with the sea coast and the blood-soaked Gully south of the Ortona-Orsogna road a rough triangle, enclosing a narrow plateau, which was itself intersected by numerous gullies and watercourses. A more westerly branch of the Riccio joined the main stream about a mile and a half inland, and on the high ground between the forks stood the small hamlets of San Nicola and San Tommaso. It was the task of the 1st Brigade to attack northward from the southern apex and drive the Germans from their positions along the west side of this triangle. After the capture of the crossroads the brigade had enjoyed two or three days of relative inaction during which the R.C.R. reorganized its hard-hit companies, and' patrols from the 48th Highlanders felt out the enemy's positions on the plateau. On 20 December and succeeding days the Highlanders watched heroic but unsuccessful attempts by a battalion of the 8th Indian Division to take Villa Grande. Patrols reported that the paratroopers were holding the Villa Grande road in strength, and were still firmly dug in east of the Riccio gully.
On 22 December, Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Spry, in temporary command of the 1st Brigade, received orders for what would be in effect the third phase of the earlier MORNING GLORY operation. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was to establish a firm base on the Tollo road in order that the 48th Highlanders might pass through and capture San Nicola and San Tomasso, with The Royal Canadian Regiment then passing through them and on to the coast, trapping the German garrison in Ortona.
Four field regiments and three medium regiments of artillery were provided for support, but heavy rain on the night of 22-23 December once again ensured difficult conditions for the tanks of "A" Squadron of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment), who were ordered to support the attack. The salient that was about to be created by the drive across the muddy plateau was to be supplied by a fleet of DUKWs (amphibious trucks) loaded at San Vito and told to land on the Adriatic coast at a prearranged point when they were needed.
The attack of the Hastings began at 09:30hrs on 23 December, as the battalion set off north from the area of Casa Berardi, and after an hour had neared the objectives north of the Villa Grande road. However, the two leading companies went to ground in the face of shells and mortar bombs and suffered heavy casualties.
In its early stages the battle went well. Able company on the left and Charlie on the right advanced three quarters of a mile, behind a barrage, against intense machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire. By 1030 hours, both companies were within a few hundred yards of their objectives, but now the artillery could no longer help them, and the weight of the enemy fire increased. A squadron of tanks, held up by enemy mine fields, failed to arrive as planned, and Baker, swinging to the right of the enemy strongpoints, attempted an assault without armoured support. The attempt failed, bloodily, but when two tanks belatedly appeared, the attack was renewed, this time with success. Overrunning the opposition, the forward platoon and the two tanks slaughtered the paratroopers where they stood, and only a few of the Germans remained alive to be herded to the rear as prisoners.
Dusk had fallen by this time and the impetus of the assault was gone. Thrusting far into the enemy lines, the Regiment was now exposed to attack from three sides, but though the Germans probed angrily all night long, they failed to break into the salient. They did, however, succeed in preventing the pioneer platoon from clearing paths through a second mine field in order that the tanks could assist in the next day's operations.6
Enemy reports admitted heavy losses of their own during this action. By noon on 24 December, the Hastings was far enough forward to attempt to consolidate the original objective, and engineers of the 1st Field Company began the task of clearing lanes through the minefields, despite continuous shellfire.
The 48th Highlanders had begun their own attack in terrible conditions, in rain and darkness and without artillery support or hope of tank support. The unit had to move in single file along a footpath not shown on maps, hardly noticeable on aerial photographs, and one that had in fact not been reconnoitred.
So dark was the night that in order to keep direction each had to hold on to some part of the equipment of the man ahead. Two unguarded houses filled with Germans opening Christmas presents yielded 19 prisoners. By morning of the 24th the battalion was at its objective on the eastern bank of the Riccio, overlooking San Nicola and San Tommaso.
The 48th sent a strong fighting patrol back to bring up support weapons but found paratroopers of the 3rd Battalion of Parachute Regiment 3 blocking their way, and they were unable to break through to the Canadian lines held by the Hastings. Efforts on the 24th to establish contact between both battalions were unsuccessful, and patrols were stopped by machine-gun fire. Three days of continuous rain reduced the area to a vast sea of mud in which tanks could not operate, and the fleet of DUKWs could not be dispatched until the brigade reached the coast and secured a landing point. The 48th Highlanders could only ration their meagre supplies; three sheep found in their area were added to the food supply. Attacks in company strength by the RCR and Hastings to try and reach the cut-off 48th were repulsed with heavy losses. However, the Germans did not realize that the 48th had established themselves in battalion strength, and not until 26 December were counter-attacks launched in their direction.
The brigade commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Spry, abandoned the plan of cutting the coast road on the morning of 25 December and instead ordered the RCR to carve out a corridor to the 48th, through which supplies could go forward and casualties could be evacuated back. After a day of constant fighting with determined groups of enemy soldiers, the RCR managed to link up with the 48th, and a carrying party of 60 men from the divisional machine gun battalion (Saskatoon Light Infantry) went out at dusk to take food and ammunition to the Highlanders. They returned at dawn on 26 December with their wounded.
At 10:00 a.m. on 26 December the 3rd Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment attacked and penetrated the Highlanders' positions, and some very close fighting followed.By midday, however, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Engineers and the Ontarios' drivers to move armour through the long salient, one troop of tanks had arrived on the scene. With this long-awaited support Johnston's men struck out vigorously at the paratroopers, driving them across the Riccio towards San Nicola and San Tommaso, and killing or capturing an estimated 100. The other two battalions of the brigade joined in routing the enemy from the scattered buildings along the edge of the plateau, and by 27 December the east bank of the Riccio upstream from San Tommaso was in our hands
In the wake of the retreat from Ortona, it was believed the Germans would withdraw to the Arielli River, a natural defensive obstacle which had many tactical characteristics that had been exploited very well on the Moro River line and during the fighting for the Gully. However, in actuality General Herr had decided on 27 December to pull back to a line running from Torre-Mucchia to run inland, west of Sn Tommaso and Villa Grande. The 1st Brigade were ordered to take both San Nicola and San Tommaso, and the 3rd, which had been rested and received reinforcements, directed to carry on to the Arielli River. Brigadier Gibson of the 3rd Brigade tasked the Royal 22e Regiment with taking the high ground between the forks of the Riccio while The Carleton and York Regiment was to cut the coast road and seize the Torre Mucchia headland, also known, to the Germans as well as the Canadians, as Point 59. The West Nova Scotia Regiment would clear the remaining ground between the Riccio and the Arielli Rivers.
It soon became apparent that the enemy was not prepared to relinquish any defensible ground without dispute. As the Royal 22e (commanded since 18 December by Major J. V. Allard) moved forward from the 48th Highlanders' area on the morning of the 29th, they came under considerable fire from the far side of the Riccio; a little later the Carleton and Yorks, approaching Highway No. 16 from the south, were halted by shelling and by determined machine-gun fire sweeping inland from the bare top of Point 59. The triangular promontory, protected on two sides by its steep seaward flanks, was held by fresh paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, which had been transferred to the coast from the right wing of the 76th Corps during the night of 27-28 December.
The enemy's interest in Torre Mucchia was understandable; its retention not only gave him effective control of the highway, but denied the Allies excellent observation of long stretches of the coast to the north. In the face of the unexpectedly strong resistance Gibson ordered the Carleton and Yorks to close into a defensive position. During the night the Germans blew the bridge which carried the highway across the mouth of the Riccio.
On the morning of the 30th the Royal 22e secured their objective within the forks of the Riccio after two costly attempts on the previous day had failed. The C.O. judged that to advance farther would create too dangerous a salient, and ordered the attack stopped.The Carleton and Yorks on the coast road had less success. When mines and mud halted a troop of the Ontarios' "B" Squadron supporting a company which Lt: Col. Pangman sent forward to clear the headland, the infantry dug in to guard the stranded tanks and await reinforcement. The year ended darkly for the New Brunswick unit. A second company attack early on the 31st was thrown back in confusion, and the few tanks that managed to reach the battalion bogged down and had to be protected. Orders came from Brigade Headquarters to postpone further attempts to take Torre Mucchia by direct assault, and instead to reduce the German resistance with mortar and observed artillery fire. Late on New Year's Eve the enemy launched a furious counter-attack under cover of lashing rain and a raging gale which swept in across the bleak coast. The relentless paratroopers burst in among the two forward companies, forcing them back and inflicting more than 50 casualties.
Point 59 did not fall until 4 January. On that day field, medium and heavy artillery regiments joined in a complex programme of sharp concentrations which intermittently switched from one target to another across the divisional front. At 4:30 p.m., before the bewildered enemy had recovered from these barrages or decided from what direction our infantry would strike, a company of the Carleton and Yorks (the regiment was now commanded by Major E. D. Danby) put in a two-pronged attack on Torre Mucchia from the highway and from the beach. By nine o'clock the promontory was in our hands. As usual the paratroopers had resisted fiercely; after the engagement 40 of them were buried near the old look-out tower. The Canadians had lost but three killed and four wounded.
The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Point 59" for participation in these actions:
1st Canadian Armoured Brigade
- 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment)
- The Carleton and York Regiment
Information courtesy of www.canadiansoldiers.com